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Tom Mullen 
I. Introduction 
This chapter considers the significance of the landmark case of Entick v Carrington1 for Scots 
law and for Scots lawyers, and others in Scotland interested in constitutional matters. How 
far, if at all, has it been influential and in what ways? In order to pursue this question, it is 
necessary to consider the different aspects of the case, ie, the varying propositions of law or 
constitutional principle for which it is thought to stand. It can be understood in at least four 
ways. First, it can be seen as a case about the law of search warrants. It supports the 
proposition that a search warrant must be specific and that a general warrant is not a lawful 
means of authorising a search of private premises. Second, it can be understood as a case 
affirming the importance of property rights in English law.2 Third, it has been seen as an 
important illustration of the role of the courts in protecting liberty or fundamental rights 
generally.3 Fourth, it has also been taken to support the much broader proposition of 
constitutional law that executive government must always be able to show legal authority for 
its actions (either in the common law or statute) and that there is no general justification for 
executive action by reference to public interest or state necessity.4 This principle is often 
referred to as an aspect of the rule of law. 
 Although it is Dicey’s exposition of the rule of law which has been most discussed, 
and Entick v Carrington is routinely cited in textbook discussions of the rule of law, Dicey 
relegates the case to a footnote. It is cited as an example of the application of his second 
meaning of the rule of law, the principle of equality before the law, which meant that public 
officials could be sued in the ordinary courts for legal wrongs committed in the same way as 
                                                 
1 (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029.  
2 KD Ewing, ‘The Politics of the British Constitution’ [2000] PL 405, 408. 
3 W Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London, Methuen/Sweet & Maxwell, 1938) xol X, 515, 658–72. 
4 DL Keir and FH Lawson, Cases in Constitutional Law, 5th edn (Oxford, Clarendon, 1967) 101, 307; RVF 
Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law (London, Stevens, 1964) 35–36; ECS Wade & AW Bradley, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law, 15th edn (London, Longman, 2011), 92  
 2 
a private citizen.5 This ability to sue officials is a specific application of each of the four 
propositions mentioned above. 
 In this chapter, I will consider the influences that Entick v Carrington has had in 
Scotland in relation to the law of warrants and searches, the protection of liberty and 
fundamental rights, and the principle of executive government being subject to law. I will not 
consider its influence (if any) on Scots property law. I will deal first with the law of warrants 
and searches, and then the broader principles of constitutional law. 
II. Search Warrants and the Criminal Process 
The earliest reference to Entick v Carrington I have identified in a Scottish law report 
appears, not surprisingly, in Bell v Black and Morrison,6 the first of three reported cases 
arising out of an illegal search. Before discussing the details of those cases, it is helpful to put 
them into the context of the Scots law on warrants as it was before they were decided.  
A. The Law before the Scottish General Warrant Cases 
The law on search warrants is discussed by, amongst others, Hume and Alison, who are both 
regarded as institutional writers on Scots criminal law. Hume sets out the law on warrants in 
his Commentaries.7 He does not identify search warrants as a distinct category, but does 
comment on searches in his discussion of arrest warrants. He describes the degree of 
specification required in a warrant as follows: 
In like manner, though it is certainly the better and more equitable course, to express the 
special cause for which a warrant is given; yet I do not know that the officer be justified if he 
refuse to execute, or the party if he resist, a more general warrant, which orders him to answer 
to such matters as shall, on examination before the magistrate, be laid his charge. But it is a 
different, and a far more exceptionable sort of warrant, which is general as to the person 
charged, and commands the bearer to apprehend all persons suspected of the matters there set 
forth, or to make search every where for stolen goods or the like. For, under a writ of this 
shape, every thing is committed to the judgment and discretion of the officer; which is very 
dangerous, and may prove the occasion of great abuses. Nay, more, though there have been no 
purpose to grant a general warrant, yet still if it so happen, per incuriam, that the writing 
                                                 
5 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th edn (Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1982) 
114. 
6 Bell v Black and Morrison (1867) 5 Irv 57. 
7 D Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes  (Edinburgh, Law Society of Scotland, 
1986 reprint) ii, 78, 
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omits, either in gremio, or by some plain and intelligible reference, to specify the person 
against whom it issues, it seems not to be a safe or lawful ground for taking anyone.8 
As in a number of other instances, Hume draws a comparison with English law. At the end of 
the first sentence quoted above, there is a footnote stating: 
Generally speaking, the law of England is more scrupulous in such matters than ours; yet 
Hale, (vol. ii. P.111); and Hawkins, (b. 2, c. 13, No. 10. No. 25) are of the opinion, that this 
holds in their practice too.9 
Alison does treat search warrants as a distinct category.10 He states that a search warrant must 
be specific: 
The search warrant must be special as to the goods intended to be searched for, or at least the 
felony which it is intended to elucidate, and bring to punishment by the warrant craved for; 
but it does not appear to be indispensable that it should set forth the particular house meant to 
be searched for these goods, any more than the particular place where the criminal is 
suspected to be concealed. It seems in short to be a sufficient authority to search for the goods 
specified, taken on the felonious occasion charged, everywhere, in the same manner as it is 
sufficient warrant to search for the individual suspected wherever he is to be found.11  
He then echoes Hume’s comment about the law of England, saying that: 
The English law, at the same time, is much more scrupulous in this matter of warrants than 
our practice [citing, inter alia, Hawkins and Hale]. Beyond all question a warrant is illegal 
which should authorise officers to search everywhere for stolen goods generally, without 
specifying either the goods sought for, or the houses suspected. If the former is not known and 
specified, the latter must be enumerated by place and name.12 
It is interesting to compare the Scots position as set out by Hume and Alison with that set out 
in Entick v Carrington and the other cases on general warrants. Both Hume and Alison agree 
that a warrant to search everywhere for stolen goods would be invalid. Alison, however, does 
not seem to regard it as necessary that a search warrant specify the particular house to be 
searched for stolen goods, provided that the warrant specifies the goods which have been 
stolen and the occasion on which they were taken. Similarly, a warrant to search a named 
house is valid even though the goods to be searched for are not specified in the warrant. It is 
not clear whether Hume believes similar latitude is allowed. The equivalent passage may be 
read either as saying that a warrant that failure to specify the place(s) to be searched is in 
itself enough to make the warrant invalid or that the combination of a failure to specify the 
person charged and a failure to specify the place(s) to be searched makes the warrant invalid. 
                                                 
8 ibid. 
9 ibid. 
10 Of course, a power to arrest and a power to search could be included in the same warrant. 
11 A Alison, Practice of the Criminal Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, W Blackwood, 1833) 146–47. 
12 ibid 147. 
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 Both in Scots and English law, a warrant which merely specified the crime(s) alleged 
to have been committed but not the person(s) to be arrested would have been regarded as 
illegal.13 However, Alison’s view certainly seems to give the investigating authorities more 
latitude in search warrants than did English law. Hale thought that a search warrant should 
specify the places to be searched14 and, although none of the group of general warrant cases 
of which Entick v Carrington is one dealt with such a warrant, it can be assumed that judges 
in those cases took for granted that a warrant which failed to specify the places to be searched 
was invalid. 
B. The Scottish General Warrant Cases 
As noted above, the earliest Scottish case referring to Entick v Carrington is Bell v Black and 
Morrison,15 the first of three reported cases arising out of the same set of facts. It is also the 
nearest equivalent Scottish case on its facts to the warrant in question purported to authorise 
an unlimited search for papers relevant to an offence. However, the first of the Scottish 
general warrant cases was decided a few years earlier. 
 In Webster v Bethune,16 following an allegation that furniture and other effects had 
been stolen from a house, a warrant was granted to ‘search, and detain, and inventory the said 
articles, and carry away the same to a place of security; and, if necessary, to break and force 
open all shut and lockfast places’. The warrant did not specify the person accused of the theft, 
the time when the offence had been committed or the particular place to be searched. On the 
strength of this warrant, Webster’s house was searched three times. The headnote states that it 
was suspended as being an illegal general warrant. The summary of the argument in the 
report notes that counsel for the respondent admitted that he could not maintain the legality of 
such a general warrant. The very brief judgment given by Lord Justice-Clerk Hope states: 
[T]his party is entitled to get rid of this warrant, which is admitted to be indefensible. If we 
refuse to suspend he might suffer considerable damage. I never saw or heard of such a 
proceeding as this.17 
The case does not state what the minimum requirements of a valid search warrant are, 
probably because the warrant and its execution were so obviously irregular. 
                                                 
13 See Hume, passage quoted above; Leach v Money, Watson and Blackmore (1763) 19 ST 1001. 
14 Sir M Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, vol II,  (London, Nutt and Gosling, 1736) 111. 
15 Bell v Black and Morrison (n 6). 
16 Webster v Bethune (1857) 2 Irv 596. 
17 ibid 598. 
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 In Bell v Black and Morrison, Bell brought a bill of suspension of a warrant granted 
by the Sheriff-Substitute of Fifeshire (sic). The case was heard by the High Court of 
Justiciary. The petition on which the warrant was based stated that the joint procurator-fiscals 
for the county were taking a precognition against one James Pringle, then in custody, who 
was accused along with other persons unknown of conspiring to kill or injure the Reverend 
James Edgar and John Ballingall, a farmer, and to set fire to their houses, and of sending 
them threatening letters. It also narrated their suspicion that Bell and four others were 
involved in the conspiracy and that they were informed and had reason to believe that written 
documents connected to the conspiracy and threatening letters were in Bell’s possession. The 
petition asked the Sheriff-Substitute to grant warrant to officers of court to search Bell’s 
house for ‘the said written documents, and all other articles tending to establish guilt, or 
participation in said crimes, and to take possession thereof’. The warrant was granted as 
requested. It was executed and various writings, books and documents, including private 
letters, were removed. 
 Although suspected, Bell was not accused of any offence at that stage, so this was a 
warrant issued to find evidence against persons who were not only not charged but whose 
identities were unknown, and to seek that evidence in the house of another person who had 
not yet been charged. The Second Division with a single opinion delivered by Lord Justice-
Clerk Inglis suspended the warrant. The petitioner’s argument was framed in terms of Scots 
law, but he did refer to a warrant of this kind having been held to be illegal in England in 
Entick v Carrington. Entick is not, however, referred to in the judgment—nor indeed are any 
other authorities. 
 The court noted three peculiarities in the petition and warrant: 
• It was granted against five different people, none of whom was charged with any 
crime. 
• There was no limitation as to the kind of papers sought to be obtained other than that 
they related to the alleged conspiracy. 
• The execution of the warrant was entrusted absolutely and without control to ordinary 
sheriff officers and their assistants. 
It appeared to be the combination of circumstances which made the warrant illegal. The court 
did not make a specific statement as to the minimum requirements for the validity of a search 
warrant and did not state that any one of the three peculiarities was by itself fatal to the 
validity of the warrant. 
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 Although the background to the case lacks the high political drama of the English 
general warrant cases, the court clearly thought it was dealing with a constitutional case: 
It involves considerations of such high constitutional principle, that if we had felt any 
hesitation as to the judgment we should pronounce, we should have asked the assistance and 
advice of the other Judges of this court. But entertaining no doubt at all, we consider it our 
duty at once to pronounce this warrant to be illegal.18 
There are close parallels to Lord Camden’s judgment in Entick. Some of the language is 
similar; Lord Inglis says: ‘But the seizure of papers made in the circumstances with which we 
have to deal is a proceeding quite unknown to the law of Scotland.’19 He also rejects the 
argument from practice in much the same manner as Lord Camden did, saying: 
 We think it right to say that no mere official practice would, in our eyes, justify such a 
warrant. Nothing short of an Act of Parliament, or a rule of the common law founded on a 
usage known to and recognised by the Court, would at all affect our judgment on this 
question. If any such practice really exists, which we do not believe, the sooner it is put an end 
to the better.20 
Lord Inglis expressed himself even more trenchantly in the first of two subsequent actions for 
damages based on the illegality of the warrant. As civil cases, these were brought in the Court 
of Session. Bell and his wife brought an action also reported under the name Bell v Black and 
Morrison.21 The defenders argued that they would only be liable in case of malice and want 
of probable cause. Lord Inglis responded to this argument by saying: 
 I can conceive nothing more startling or unconstitutional, than that the defence put forward in 
this action should be sustained. 
 … 
[A] more illegal proceeding it never was my duty as a judge to consider. It is as illegal as if it 
had been a warrant to bring up a party for examination under torture, and therefore the sense 
in which the warrant is illegal is the highest in which that word can be used.22 
In the same case, Lord Neaves said: 
If these pleas were to be sustained, it would make a most serious alteration in our 
constitutional law.  
…  
It seems to me to be one of the most illegal warrants I ever heard of. Some of us can 
remember a time when, if such a warrant had been obtained in connection with a political 
                                                 
18 Bell v Black and Morrison (n 6) 64. 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid. 
21 Bell v Black and Morrison (1865) 3 M 1026. 
22 ibid 1029. 
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offence, the dissatisfaction that would have been excited would not have been appeased by a 
mere claim of damages against a procurator fiscal.23 
The other case, Nelson v Black and Morrison,24 was brought by a man who thought he had 
been defamed by being named in the petition for the warrant. This case came before the First 
Division rather than the Second Division. All four of the judges were different from those 
who heard the civil action brought by Bell and his wife. However, one of the four judges, 
Lord Ardmillan, had participated in the justiciary proceedings which had declared the warrant 
illegal. 
 In Nelson, Lord President McNeill, with whom the other judges concurred, drew a 
distinction between two different types of illegality. If the search was ‘out of all law and 
reason’, that was one kind of illegality which he described as relating to ‘the substance of the 
proceedings’. If, on the other hand, the objection was ‘merely that the premises ought not to 
have been searched in this particular form’, that was another matter.25 
 In the case of a substantive illegality, the pursuer need not prove malice and want of 
probable cause. In the case of formal illegality, it was necessary to show that the defender’s 
statements were made maliciously and without probable cause. Lord McNeill thought that the 
case fell into the latter category. A legal warrant could have been granted on the basis of the 
petition. If the Sheriff had limited the search to particular documents or required it to be 
carried out under his supervision, it would not have been illegal. 
 Lord Deas agreed that a warrant in the terms asked for would have been legal if the 
Sheriff required it to be executed under his supervision. Lord Ardmillan remained of the view 
that the warrant granted to search Bell’s house had been illegal. Nonetheless, although he 
emphasised that: 
…a general warrant for a sweeping and indefinite search in the dwelling-house of a person not 
put under charge, for written documents … which must be read before it can be seen what 
they instruct … is a very strong and startling procedure …26 
he also suggested that such a warrant would be legal ‘if accompanied by proper securities 
against oppressive execution’ such as supervision of its execution by the sheriff. ‘The 
illegality of the warrant lay in the absence of such securities.’27 
                                                 
23 ibid 1031. It is not clear what past political controversies Lord Neaves is referring to here. 
24 Nelson v Black and Morrison (1866) 4 M 328. 
25 ibid 330–31. 
26 ibid 332. 
27 ibid. 
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 Was the approach taken by the court in Nelson consistent with that taken in the other 
two cases? Certainly, the courts were addressing different questions. As Lord Deas noted, the 
cases are distinguishable because Bell’s action for damages was based on an actual search of 
Bell’s house, whereas Nelson against whom the warrant had not been executed was suing for 
defamation. Also, both Lords McNeill and Deas thought that the cause of action was a 
judicial slander and there was authority that a prosecutor was not liable for slander unless he 
had acted maliciously and without probable cause.28 
 As far as criminal procedure goes, the cases can be reconciled on the basis that the 
judgment of the court in the first case can be read as holding that the warrant was illegal 
because a lack of limitation as to the papers to be searched was combined with the absence of 
judicial supervision of its execution. Based on these authorities, the minimum requirements 
of a search warrant in Scots law appear to be that the premises to be searched are specified 
and that either the papers or articles to be searched for are specified or, if they are not, that 
the execution of the warrant is judicially supervised. It is not clear if by this time a Scottish 
court would have endorsed Alison’s suggestion that the particular house to be searched need 
not be specified. However, as a practical matter, it is unlikely that a sheriff or justice of the 
peace would have asked for such a warrant. Nonetheless, although the cases can be 
reconciled in this way, Lord McNeill’s categorisation of the defect in the warrant as a ‘want 
of formality’ or ‘want of caution’ in execution rather than a defect of substance suggests a 
more relaxed attitude to the legality of warrants than is held by Lord Inglis. 
 However, as a matter of private law, ie, liability in damages, there is a clear 
inconsistency between the decision in the second Bell v Black and Morrison case and the 
decision in Nelson. In the first case, all four judges were agreed that proof of malice and want 
of probable cause were not required in the case of this warrant as it was wholly illegal and 
ultra vires. This was plainly inconsistent with the view taken in Nelson that the pursuer did 
need to prove malice and want of probable cause in respect of the same warrant! 
 So, viewed in isolation, Bell v Black and Morrison may seem to be a Scottish 
equivalent of Entick v Carrington. Viewed in the context of the related litigation, this 
interpretation seems less compelling. However, if we take a longer-term view, it is clear that 
the stricter attitude of Lord Inglis has prevailed. Webster, Bell and Nelson continue to be cited 
as the primary authorities for the proposition that general warrants are illegal and for the 
                                                 
28 ibid 331–33. 
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degree of specificity required in warrants,29 and it is assumed, contrary to what Alison states, 
that a search warrant must specify the premises to be searched.30 It is also clear that Bell v 
Black and Morrison did not subsequently catch the imagination of lawyers in the way that 
Entick v Carrington has and never achieved the same iconic status. 
 Interestingly, and as a warning against complacency, Scottish prosecutors did apply 
for a general warrant as recently as 1987 in the Zircon affair. The BBC had made a series of 
television programmes on secrecy. One programme mentioned the existence of a secret spy 
satellite programme (Zircon). The government thought that there might have been breaches 
of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. A sheriff granted a warrant that authorised 
police to search the premises and if necessary any person found there for ‘any sketch, plan, 
model, article, note or document or anything of a like nature including in particular any film 
which is evidence of an offence under said Act [the Official Secrets Act]’. This warrant was 
successfully challenged as it failed to specify the offence that had been or was about to be 
committed.31 The warrant made no reference to any section of the Act, even though there 
were many different offences under it.32 
C. Did Entick v Carrington Influence the Decision in the Scottish General 
Warrant Cases? 
The obvious question is whether Entick v Carrington influenced the decision in the Bell 
litigation. Certainly, the nature of the warrant in Bell was similar to that in Entick, the latter 
was referred to by counsel in argument, the case was perceived by Lord Inglis to be of 
constitutional importance and the judgment includes rhetorical flourishes reminiscent of those 
in Lord Camden’s judgment. However, these circumstances only make it plausible that Entick 
was influential. The terms of the judgment are equally compatible with the decision being 
grounded in Scots law. Counsel’s argument referred to several Scots authorities—Hume, 
Alison and Hutcheson’s Treatise on the Offices of Justice of the Peace—as well as Entick. 
                                                 
29 See, eg, RW Renton and HH Brown, Criminal Procedure According to the Law of Scotland, 6th edn 
(Edinburgh, W Green, 1996) pt II, 5-09 and 5-10; CN Stoddart, Criminal Warrants, 2nd edn (Edinburgh, 
Butterworths, 1999) 1.19, 5.05. 
30 See Stoddart (n 29) 1.19, who cites Hume, Alison, Nelson and Webster to support this proposition. 
31 BBC v Jessop (February 1987, unreported, High Court of Justiciary). 
32 A subsequent application for a more narrowly drawn warrant relating to suspected offences under s 2 of the 
Act was granted. 
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There is no evidence within the judgment itself of influences as no authorities of any kind are 
cited, no doubt because, as Lord Inglis says, the illegality was particularly blatant. 
 Subsequent developments suggest that Entick v Carrington was not a major influence 
on Scots law with regard to search warrants. The Scottish courts applied similar principles, 
but the case is not referred to in subsequent cases on warrants or in textbooks on the criminal 
process. Instead, the Scottish authorities are relied on. 
 That Entick v Carrington has not had a major influence on the law on searches is not 
surprising in view of the separate development of Scots criminal law, criminal procedure and 
policing, and the absence of any strong pressure for convergence between Scotland and 
England in criminal matters.33 The fact that the law on search warrants came to be very 
similar in the two jurisdictions is more likely to be a case of parallel evolution. 
D. Search without a Warrant 
Lord Camden’s judgment in Entick v Carrington was broadly enough expressed to make it 
possible to use it as authority on searches without a warrant given its emphasis on the 
inviolability of property rights. It is in this context that the only recent reference to it in a 
Scottish criminal case occurs. That case is Gillies v Ralph.34 Although it does not concern a 
search warrant, it does concern entry to premises by the police for the purposes of 
investigating crime. Section 14 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 199535 allowed the 
police to detain a person reasonably suspected of having committed an offence punishable by 
imprisonment for up to six hours at a time without arrest or charge (later increased to 12 
hours). In this case, the police went to the flat of which Gillies was the householder to try and 
find out the whereabouts of a man, James Scott, believed to be her boyfriend, in connection 
with an act of vandalism of which he was suspected. Gillies told them that Scott was not there 
and refused permission to search her flat. Then officers saw Scott in the hallway. One officer 
cautioned him and told him he was being detained under section 14 of the 1995 Act. He 
moved briskly up the hallway away from the officers and Gillies tried to close the front door. 
The police forced their way in and removed Scott from the flat. Gillies, the householder, was 
                                                 
33 There are some exceptions, eg, legislation on traffic offences, controlled drugs and national security issues. 
34 Gillies v Ralph 2008 SLT 978. 
35 Since repealed and replaced by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2014, sched 1, para 27(a). 
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then charged and convicted of obstructing police officers in the execution of their duty under 
section 41 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967. 
 On appeal, Gillies argued that the police had acted unlawfully in entering her house 
without consent or a warrant. The High Court of Justiciary allowed the appeal. The police 
had had no lawful authority to enter the house and Gillies was entitled to close her door to 
prevent their entry. The court accepted that there were some circumstances in which police 
officers were entitled to enter private property without consent or a warrant, but they declined 
to develop the common law further to authorise entry to private property in order to detain a 
person. Lord Reed, giving the opinion of the court, stated: 
If a police officer enters private property without permission to do so, he is (unless authorised 
by common law or statute) acting unlawfully under the civil law: a fortiori, if force is used 
without lawful justification. As Brennan J observed in Halliday v Nevill (para 4): 
A police officer who enters or remains on private property without the leave and licence 
of the person in possession or entitled to possession commits a trespass and acts outside 
the course of his duty unless his entering or remaining on the premises is authorised or 
excused by law. 
That principle is, in Brennan J’s words, ‘of ancient origin but of enduring importance’, and 
forms part of the common heritage of the legal systems of the United Kingdom and the wider 
common law world (cf. Entick v Carrington; Great Central Rly v Bates; Eccles v Bourque; 
Kuru v State of New South Wales).  
Whilst it is interesting to see Entick v Carrington used in this way, it does not suggest that it 
has been a strong influence in itself; rather, it provides an example of parallel development. 
In fact, Entick v Carrington seems to have been more influential for the broader propositions 
of constitutional law for which it is thought to stand. It is to these which I now turn. 
 III. Fundamental Rights and the Constitutional Limits of Executive 
Power 
A. Cases Citing Entick v Carrington 
The influence in Scotland of Entick v Carrington in relation to these broader propositions is 
to be found in the literature of constitutional law rather than in the cases. I have found only 
one case in which it is discussed, Davidson v Scottish Ministers (No 2).36 In two other cases 
                                                 
36 Davidson v Scottish Ministers (No 2) [2005] UKHL 74; 2006 SC (HL) 41. 
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there are passing references, but nothing substantive.37 In Davidson, the House of Lords had 
to decide whether the apparent exclusion of coercive remedies against the Crown in section 
21 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 prevented interdict and specific performance being 
granted against the Crown in judicial review proceedings in Scotland. Lord Rodger made 
these comments on the historical importance of the law of tort or delict as a way of 
vindicating the subject’s rights and freedoms: 
Reform of the private law and its procedures in respect of the Crown was no insignificant 
matter. By concentrating on judicial review, lawyers and judges today may tend to forget the 
historical importance of the law of tort or delict as a way of vindicating the subject’s rights 
and freedoms. To take only the most obvious example, Entick v Carrington was an action of 
trespass for breaking and entering the plaintiff’s house and seizing his papers. As Weir puts it 
in his peerless Casebook on Tort (p 18), in addition to providing compensation, the other 
function of the law of tort is ‘to vindicate the rights of the citizen and to sanction their 
infringement. In this respect the flagship of the fleet is not negligence but trespass, protecting 
as it does the rights of freedom of movement, physical integrity, and the land and goods in 
one’s possession’. So, if pushed too far, the doctrine that the Crown can do no wrong and so 
cannot be liable in tort could have been an engine of tyranny. But actions against officers of 
the Crown (such as Carrington, a King’s messenger) as individuals meant that the law of tort 
could be used to protect the liberties and property of the subject.38 
He ends that paragraph by commenting: 
Indeed Dicey’s second meaning of the ‘rule of law’ as a characteristic of England was ‘that 
here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm 
and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals’ (Introduction to the Law of the 
Constitution, p 193). The same applied in Scotland (McDonald v Secretary of State for 
Scotland39 is indeed a more recent case in point). 
The suggestion that Scots and English law both satisfied Dicey’s second meaning of the rule 
of law was uncontroversial. Having considered the case law, I now move on to the literature. 
B. Books and Articles on Constitutional Law 
Although Entick v Carrington has not been cited in works on the criminal process, it has been 
regularly cited in books on constitutional law to illustrate both the role of the courts and 
common law in protecting liberty or fundamental rights and the general proposition that 
                                                 
37 In Dalziel School Board v Scotch Education Department 1914 2 SLT 449, a dispute over the dismissal of a 
teacher, Entick v Carrington was apparently referred to in argument, but not in any of the judgments. More 
recently, in Sovereign Dimensional Survey Ltd v Cooper 2009 SC 382, in which the Court of Session had made 
an order equivalent to an Anton Piller order, the court merely quoted a passage from Lord Denning’s judgment 
in Anton Piller which itself referred to Entick v Carrington, but the Inner House makes no comment on Entick v 
Carrington. 
38 Davidson v Scottish Ministers (No 2) [2005] UKHL 74 [73]. 
39 McDonald v Secretary of State for Scotland 1994 SC 234. 
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executive government must always be able to show legal authority for its actions (the 
principle of executive legality). 
 The earliest reference that I have found in a work written by a Scots lawyer is in the 
Source Book of Constitutional History from 166040 by D Oswald Dykes, Professor of 
Constitutional Law and Constitutional History in the University of Edinburgh. Dykes 
reproduces a substantial except from the State Trials report in chapter XI, which is entitled 
‘Personal Liberty and Habeas Corpus’, along with Leach v Money and Wilkes v Wood, and 
includes a paragraph on the general warrants cases in his introduction.41 It is not clear to what 
extent Dykes’ source book was read by lawyers. The preface makes clear that it was aimed 
principally at advanced students in history (ie, those studying for the honours degree). In any 
event, it does not claim to be a book on Scots law or to provide a Scottish perspective on the 
constitution. The preface refers to the constitutional history of ‘this country’ and the 
introduction refers to changes in the governmental machinery of ‘this country’. This country 
is plainly the UK even though the book includes a substantial period before the Acts of Union 
(1660–1706). 
 A few years later, WIR Fraser, Advocate and Lecturer in Constitutional Law at the 
University of Edinburgh42 and who later became Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, published a 
book which was aimed at lawyers, An Outline of Constitutional Law (1938).43 The preface 
states that it was written at the suggestion of the General Council of the Law Society of 
Scotland and was intended primarily for candidates for professional examinations, although 
the author hoped that it would also prove to be useful to university students, particularly as 
there was no other book ‘dealing with constitutional law from the point of view of the 
Scottish lawyer’, with the exception of Dykes and Philip’s Chapters in Constitutional Law. 
 Fraser does not cite Entick v Carrington in the context of search warrants. He 
discusses search warrants in his chapter on ‘The Right to Freedom of the Person’, where he 
says: ‘the warrant must specify the premises to be searched and the articles to be seized. A 
general search warrant is illegal’.44 There follows a summary of Bell v Black and Morrison. 
However, he does refer to Entick v Carrington in his chapter on the rule of law, specifically 
                                                 
40 DO Dykes & JR Philip, Source Book of Constitutional History from 1660 (London, Longmans, Green & Co, 
1930). 
41 ibid 56–57. 
42 Fraser had previously been Lecturer in Constitutional Law at the University of Glasgow. 
43 WIR Fraser, An Outline of Constitutional Law (London, William Hodge & Co, 1938). 
44 ibid 191–92. 
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in his discussion of Dicey’s second meaning of the rule of law, namely that of equality before 
the law. Having made the point that public officials are subject to the law in the same way as 
private individuals and can be sued for a legally wrongful act, he says that it is no defence 
that an action was necessary in the public interest and that this point was decided in Entick v 
Carrington, quoting the relevant passage from Lord Camden’s judgment.45 
 The next comprehensive account of Scots constitutional law was published in 1964, 
JDB Mitchell’s Constitutional Law.46 Mitchell cites Entick v Carrington in a footnote at p 
144 and in in the text at p 180 in the course of a discussion of the prerogative, citing the 
passage from Camden’s judgment on state necessity at the latter page. He also refers to it at p 
334, in the chapter on fundamental rights, in the course of a discussion of freedom of 
property. He discusses the requirement for a warrant to enter property to be specific, which 
he notes was established in England in Wilkes v Wood and Entick v Carrington, and 
comments that similar principles were affirmed in Scotland in Bell v Black and Morrison. 
 After this, references to Entick v Carrington become commonplace. It is typically 
referred to on the context of discussion of the rule of law, particularly to support the 
proposition that executive government has no inherent powers and must always be able to 
show legal authority for its actions. Thus, for example, Clyde and Edwards refer to it in their 
textbook Judicial Review,47 quoting the relevant passage from Lord Camden’s’ judgment. 
Similar use is made of the case by Ashton and Finch,48 Munro49 and Himsworth and 
O’Neill.50 
 Through these, and also through constitutional law texts written from an English 
perspective but widely read in Scotland, Entick v Carrington has become familiar to 
generations on Scots lawyers, but it is also worth examining whether it has become more 
widely known. 
C. Publications for a Lay Readership 
                                                 
45 ibid 17–18, quoting the passage at (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1073. 
46 JDB Mitchell, Constitutional Law (Edinburgh, W Green, 1964; 2nd edn, 1968). 
47 Rt Hon Lord Clyde and DJ Edwards (Edinburgh, W Green, 2000) 4.14. 
48 C Ashton and V Finch, Constitutional Law in Scotland (Edinburgh, W Green, 2000) 63, 18.05. 
49 J Munro, Public Law, 2nd edn (Edinburgh, W Green, 2004). 
50 C Himsworth and C O’Neill, Scotland’s Constitution: Law and Practice, 2nd edn (Haywards Heath, 
Bloomsbury Professional, 2009). 
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I have not conducted an exhaustive search of newspaper and periodical literature, but have 
identified several references to Entick v Carrington in Scottish publications aimed at the 
general reading public as opposed to lawyers or historians. The earliest reference I have 
found is in a lengthy article on the Aliens Acts 1793, which appeared in the Edinburgh 
Review for April 1825.51 The article concerned the right of the Crown to exclude or dismiss 
an alien from the realm at pleasure. In analysing the reasons that had been given in the past to 
support the existence of such a prerogative, the author states: 
In the most important judgment, which determined, that a warrant to search for, and seize the 
papers of the accused, in the case of a seditious libel is contrary to law, Lord Camden said, 
(Entick v Carrington 19 St. Tr. 1067) ‘The judges must look into their books. If it is law, it 
will be found in our books. If it is not to be found there, it is not law.’ 
Here, the case is being used to support the principle of executive legality. In a sense this is a 
passing reference, but the description of the case as ‘most important’ seems noteworthy. 
What is also striking about the piece is the particularly detailed historical and legal analysis; 
the piece presupposed a highly educated and engaged readership.  
 Another reference appears in the Glasgow Herald of 3 January 1868. This article is a 
reproduction of an item from The Times of the previous day (something the Glasgow Herald 
regularly did at that time), under the title ‘The Irish Fenian Press’.52 The Times had been 
publishing extracts from Irish newspapers which the author regarded as seditious and the 
purpose of the article had been to explain the law of sedition to The Times’ readers and to call 
for the law to be enforced against Irish nationalists. The author quotes a passage from Lord 
Camden’s judgment in which he explains the reasons for punishing seditious libel. This is 
therefore an aspect of the case which is less resonant today and perhaps we should not read 
too much into it, as the piece was originally written for an English audience. 
 Rather more recently, a reference to Entick v Carrington appears in a book review in 
The Scotsman of 10 January 1924. The book in question was The Principal Secretary of 
State: A Survey of the Office from 1558 to 1680 by FM Grier Evans.53 The reviewer 
comments: 
                                                 
51 ‘Art IV. On the Alien Bill’ Edinburgh Review (April 1825), 99–174. The article bears to have been written 
‘By an Alien’. The use of pseudonyms was not uncommon at the time. The content and forms of expression 
used suggest that the author was not in fact an alien. 
52 Glasgow Herald, 3 January 1869. The author of the item in The Times was described as ‘Scaevola’. 
53 FM Grier Evans, The Principal Secretary of State: A Survey of the Office from 1558 to 1680 (London, 
Longmans, 1923). 
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The great battle fought over his right of commitment and of seizure of papers receives 
adequate treatment (my italics)., ‘The author examines the conclusions reached in the various 
eighteenth century trials, especially Entick v Carrington and then illustrates by a brief survey 
of the records what in fact was the seventeenth century procedure. She shows that secretarial 
commitments upon warrants in which the cause of commitment was not shown were common. 
The abuse of this practice, as is well known, led to the passing of the Habeas Corpus Act. 
(Emphasis added) 
This passage suggests both that the writer of the review was familiar with the general warrant 
cases and that the readers of The Scotsman were expected to have some idea of the 
eighteenth-century constitutional struggles. 
 Although this has been a highly selective survey, it suggests that the perception of 
Entick v Carrington as a key constitutional case was neither restricted to England nor to 
lawyers. 
D. The Influence of Entick v Carrington in Scots Constitutional Law 
Having reviewed a number of sources referring to Entick v Carrington, I will now consider 
how significant it has been as a point of reference in Scots constitutional law and history. The 
references above show that in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Entick v 
Carrington has been taken to illustrate principles common to Scots and English law. 
 As noted above, it does not seem that it has had much influence on the development 
of the law of search warrants. However, the broader significance of Entick v Carrington, 
whether as an exemplar of the importance with which the right of property was regarded, of 
the principle of executive legality or of the protection of liberty more generally, was clearly 
appreciated in Scotland. This is not surprising. From the mid eighteenth to the mid-twentieth 
centuries, political and legal thought was dominated by a unionist perspective.54 There was 
widespread acceptance of the union and of Scotland’s place within it. Whilst it was very 
important that major institutional differences had been preserved (the established church, 
education, the courts and Scots law), there was also a strong tendency to treat much of the 
pre-union English constitutional history as part of a constitutional inheritance common to 
Great Britain. More generally, there was a tendency not to distinguish clearly between terms 
like England/English, Scotland/Scots and Britain/British, or the precise political communities 
to which these terms referred. 
                                                 
54 C Kidd, Union and Unionisms: Political Thought in Scotland 1500–2000 (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
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 More generally, broadening the focus beyond constitutional law, during the eighteenth 
century, there seems not to have been great enthusiasm for preserving some of the distinctive 
features of Scots law (eg, the continued importance of feudal principle) or great concern 
about the influence of English law and legal forms. The primary concern was with 
improvement in the law and the legal system to meet the needs of a developing society55 and, 
in the nineteenth century, there was considerable support for the assimilation of Scots to 
English law, particularly in the field of commercial law.56 
 We can see the assumption of a common constitutional inheritance at work in Fraser’s 
account of constitutional doctrine which displays impeccably Diceyan orthodoxy. Whilst 
discussing a number of areas where Scots law was different, he treats the basic doctrines of 
the constitution (eg, the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament) as British with no 
distinct Scottish dimension. There is no hint of the distinct perspective that emerged in the 
celebrated case of MacCormick v Lord Advocate57 a mere 15 years later. Similarly, we have 
Dykes’ omission of any national qualifier in the title of his work on constitutional history and 
his referring to ‘this country’ without saying which country he means. 
 We can also see the same assumption in works aimed at a lay audience. The article on 
the Aliens Act in the Edinburgh Review discussed above refers on the first page to ‘an 
outrage on the ancient policy of England’,58 then on the second to the Alien Act being ‘no 
standing part of the constitution of Britain’.59 There follow numerous references to ‘England’, 
‘the Crown’ and the ‘English constitution’. The article ends with a plea to repeal ‘this odious 
enactment’ so that ‘as Englishmen we shall not need to blush in the presence of these 
strangers’.60 Whilst this might be read as indicating that the author was: (a) English; and (b) 
insensitive to the Scottish dimension of the UK, it was clearly thought that the readership 
would find this article relevant to them and, as we have seen, even Scots lawyers such as 
Dykes were prone to the tendency to elide the distinctions between England, Scotland and 
Britain. 
                                                 
55 ibid 178–90. 
56 ibid 190–98. 
57 MacCormick v Lord Advocate 1953 SC 396 
58 ‘On the Alien Bill’ (n 51) 99. 
59 ibid 100. 
60 ibid 173. 
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 Legal nationalism did not arise as a significant phenomenon until the mid-twentieth 
century,61 but it did little to shake perceptions of a common constitutional inheritance. The 
reasons for this included that several of its exponents were unionist in their politics and that 
much of the emphasis was on private law rather than public law. One outstanding exception 
was the debate over the status of the Treaty of Union as fundamental law stimulated by Lord 
Cooper’s remarks in MacCormick v Lord Advocate,62 but although those remarks suggested 
that the two legal systems might rest on different basic foundational norms, that did not led 
legal nationalists to  suggest that there were other major differences of constitutional 
principle between Scots and English law. Even the devolution settlement which creates 
greater scope for divergence in substantive law including much of the law relating to Scottish 
government is built on essentially UK foundations; devolved government follows the 
Westminster system with relatively modest alterations, and the areas of law most affected by 
the broader propositions for which Entick v Carrington is today cited—judicial review and 
the law of government liability—are very close in Scotland and England and seem to have 
converged further in recent decades. 
IV. Conclusions 
To return to the question with which I began—how far, if at all, Entick v Carrington has been 
influential in Scots law—as far as the law on search warrants goes, it seems not to have been 
a major influence, although the Scottish courts applied similar principles. As discussed 
above, this is not surprising in view of the separate development of Scots criminal law, 
criminal procedure and policing. 
 As to the broader significance of Entick v Carrington, the general ideas about the 
source and nature of the powers of executive government and the role of the courts in 
protecting individual liberty and controlling government power seem to have been pretty 
much the same in Scotland and England in the 250 years since it was decided, and the case 
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itself is routinely referred to by textbook writers. These aspects of the concept of the rule of 
law are conceived of in the same way by Scots lawyers as they are by English lawyers.  
